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Abstract—The unevenness importance of criminal activities in the onion domains of the Tor Darknet and the different levels of their
appeal to the end-user make them tangled to measure their influence. To this end, this paper presents a novel content-based ranking
framework to detect the most influential onion domains. Our approach comprises a modeling unit that represents an onion domain
using forty features extracted from five different resources: user-visible text, HTML markup, Named Entities, network topology, and
visual content. And also, a ranking unit that, using the Learning-to-Rank (LtR) approach, automatically learns a ranking function by
integrating the previously obtained features. Using a case-study based on drugs-related onion domains, we obtained the following
results. (1) Among the explored LtR schemes, the listwise approach outperforms the benchmarked methods with an NDCG of 0.95 for
the top-10 ranked domains. (2) We proved quantitatively that our framework surpasses the link-based ranking techniques. Also, (3) with
the selected feature, we observed that the textual content, composed by text, NER, and HTML features, is the most balanced
approach, in terms of efficiency and score obtained. The proposed framework might support Law Enforcement Agencies in detecting
the most influential domains related to possible suspicious activities.
Index Terms—Tor, Darknet, Influence detection, Learning-to-Rank, Feature Extraction, Hidden Services.
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1 INTRODUCTION
THE Onion Router (Tor) network, which is known to beone of the most famous Darknet networks, gives the
end-users a high level of privacy and anonymity. The Tor
project was proposed in the mid-1990s by the US military re-
searchers to secure intelligence communications. However,
a few years later, and as part of their strategy for secrecy,
they made the Tor project available for the public [1].
The onion domains proliferated rapidly and the latest
statistics stated by the onion metrics website1 has reported
that the number of currently existing onion domains has
increased from 30K to almost 90K between April 2015 and
October 2019.
The community of the Tor network refers to an onion
domain hosted in the Tor darknet by a Hidden Service (HS).
Those services can be accessed via a particular web browser
called Tor Browser2 or a proxy such as Tor2Web3.
There are many legal uses for the Tor network, such as
personal blogs, news domains, and discussion forums [2],
[3]. However, due to its level of anonymity, Tor Darknet
is being exploited by services traders allowing them to
promote their products freely, including, but not limited to
Child Sexual Abuse (CSA) [4], [5], drugs trading [5], [6], [7],
[8], and counterfeit personal identifications [9], [10], [11].
The high level of privacy and anonymity provided by
the Tor network obstructed the authorities monitoring tools
from controlling the content or even identifying the IP
address of the hosts who are behind any suspicious service.
• M. Al-Nabki, E. Fidalgo, E. Alegre, and D. Chaves are with the School of
Industrial Engineering, Computer Science and Aeronautics, Universidad
de Leo´n, Spain. Also, they are Researchers at INCIBE (Spanish Na-
tional Cybersecurity Institute), Leo´n, Spain. (e-mails:{mnab, efidf, ealeg,
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1. https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-seen.html
2. https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en
3. https://tor2web.org/
Fig. 1. Overview of a Tor monitoring system. Two of our previous re-
search contributions are highlighted in orange.
We collaborate with the Spanish National Cybersecurity
Institute (INCIBE4), to develop tools that could ease the
task of monitoring the Tor Darknet and detecting existing
or new suspicious contents. These tools are designed to
support the Spanish Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in
their surveillance of the Tor hidden services. An overview of
two of our current contributions to the Tor monitoring tool
is summarized in Figure 1.
The first contribution to the monitoring system pre-
sented in Figure 1 was a classification module, which detects
and isolates the categories of suspicious onion domains that
Spanish LEAs are interested in monitoring. For this task, we
used our supervised text classifier presented in [11], which
categorizes HSs into eight classes: Pornography, Cryptocur-
rency, Counterfeit Credit Cards, Drugs, Violence, Hacking,
4. In Spanish, it stands for the Instituto Nacional de Ciberseguridad
de Espan˜a
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2Counterfeit Money, and Counterfeit Personal Identification
including Driving-License, Identification, and Passport.
The second module, which is also the focus of this work,
addresses the problem of ranking the hidden services that
were classified as suspicious. Once they are ranked, a police
officer can prioritize her/his work by focusing on the most
influential HSs, i.e., those which are in the first positions of
the rank. In our previous work [2], we presented a ranking
algorithm, called ToRank, to sort the onion domains by
analyzing the connectivity of their hyperlinks, what was
a linked-based approach. In this case, sharing the same
objective, we propose a more rich solution for ranking them
by analyzing as well the content of the domains.
One of the difficulties we faced was how to define the
influence of a given onion domain based on its ability to
attract the public. In this work, we assess the attractiveness
of an onion domain, and we assign accordingly to it a score
that reflects its influence among the other domains with
similar content. Hence, the more attractive is a domain, the
higher the score it receives. Using our text classifier, the
ranking module we are proposing works at category-level
and detects the influential HS in each category. Therefore,
this paper aims to answer the following question: What
are the most attractive onion domains in a determined area of
activities?
The answer to this question could improve the capability
of LEAs in keeping a close eye on the suspicious Hidden Ser-
vices more influential by concentrating their efforts in mon-
itoring them rather than the less influential ones. Moreover,
in the case a Law Enforcement Agency takes a suspicious
HS down, the proposed ranking module would recognize
the same domain again if it still holds the same content, even
if it were hosted under a different or new address. Similarly,
when a new domain is introduced to the network for the
first time, and it hosts suspicious content similar to an HS
that was previously nominated as influential, the ranking
module could capture it before becoming popular among
Tor users. Therefore, LEAs will have the needed information
to strike the suspicious domains preemptively earlier.
A straightforward strategy to detect the influential onion
domains is to sort them by the number of clients’ requests
that they receive, i.e., analyzing the traffic of the network.
However, the design of the Tor network is oriented to pre-
venting this behavior [12]. Chaabane et al. [13] conducted
a deep analysis for the Tor network traffic through estab-
lishing six exit nodes distributed over the world with the
default exit policy. However, this approach can not assess
the traffic of onion domains that are not reachable through
these exit nodes. Furthermore, it could be risky because the
Tor network users could reach any onion domain, regardless
of its legality, through the IP addresses of the machines
dedicated to that purpose. Biryukov et al. [14] tried to
exploit the concept of entry guard nodes [15] to de-anonymize
clients of a Tor hidden service. However, this proposal will
not be feasible as soon as the vulnerability is fixed.
Another strategy is to employ a link-based ranking
algorithm such as ToRank [2], PageRank [16], Hyperlink-
Induced Topic Search (HITS) [17], or Katz [18]. We explored
it in our previous work [2], and we concluded that the
main drawback of this approach lies in its dependency on
hyperlinks connectivity between the onion domains [19].
Hence, if an influential but isolated domain exists in the
network, this technique can not recognize it as an essential
item.
In this paper, we present an alternative approach that
incorporates several features that are extracted from the HSs
into a Learning to Rank (LtR) schema [20]. Given a list of
hidden services, our model ranks onion domains based on
two key steps: content feature extraction and onion domain
ranking. First, we represent each onion domain by a forty el-
ements feature vector extracted from five different resources
that are: 1) the textual content of the domain, 2) the textual
Named Entities (NE) in the user-visible text like products
names and organizations names, 3) the HTML markup code
by taking advantage of specific HTML tags, 4) the visual
content like the images exposed in the domain, and finally
5) the position of the targeted onion domain with respect to
the Tor network topology. Second, the extracted features are
cleaned and normalized to train a ranking function using
the LtR approach to rank the domains and to propose top-k
HSs as the most influential.
The ranking problem addressed in this paper is close to
the field of Information Retrieval (IR) but with a significant
difference. Both issues will retrieve a ranked list of elements
similarly to how search engines work. For example, the
Google search engine considers more than 200 factors to
generate a ranked list of websites concerning a query [21].
However, in the context of our problem, we do not have
a search term to order the results accordingly. Instead, our
objective is to rank the domains based on a virtual query:
What are the most attractive onion domains in a determined
area of activities? Hence, this model adopts IR to solve the
problem of ranking and detecting the most influential onion
domain in the Tor network, but without having available a
search term.
Nevertheless, the proposed framework is not only re-
stricted to ranking the onion domains of the Tor network. It
could be generalized and be adapted to different areas with
slight modifications in the feature vector, as for example,
document ranking, web pages of the Surface Web, or users
in a social network, among others. Our focus on this field,
based on the special sensitivity of the HS contents, motivates
our application in the Tor network, and, additionally, we
wanted to test the use of IR techniques for single query
ranking problems.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarised
in the following way.
• We propose a novel framework to rank the HSs and
to detect the most influential ones. Our strategy ex-
ploits five groups of features extracted from Tor HSs
via a Hidden Service Modeling Unit (HSMU). The
extracted features are used to train the Supervised
Learning-to-Rank Unit (SLRU). Our approach out-
performs the link-based ranking technique, such as
ToRank, PageRank, HITS, and Katz, when tested on
samples of onion domains related to the marketing
of drugs (Fig. 2).
• We evaluated 40 features extracted from five re-
sources: 1) user-visible textual, 2) textual named
entities, 3) the HTML markup code, 4) the visual
content, and 5) features drawn from the topology
3of the Tor network. In particular, we address the
effects of representing an onion domain by several
variations of features on the ranking framework. We
identify the most efficient combination of features
compared to their cost of extraction in terms of the
prediction time and the resources needed to build the
features extraction model.
• To select the best LtR schema, we explore and com-
pare three popular architectures: pointwise, pairwise,
and listwise.
• Finally, we create a manually ranked dataset, that
plays the role of ground truth for testing the models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we summarize the related work. After that, Section 3 intro-
duces the proposed ranking framework, including its main
components. Section 4 presents the experimental settings
along with the configuration of the framework units. Next,
Section 5 addresses a case study to test the effectiveness
of the proposed framework in a real case scenario. Finally,
Section 6 presents the main conclusions of this work and
introduces other approaches that we are planning to explore
in the future.
2 RELATED WORK
There are plenty of works tackling the study of the sus-
picious activities that take place in the Darknet of the Tor
network, as are the illicit drugs markets [22], [23], [24],
terrorist activities [25], [26], arms smuggling, and violence
[27], or cybercrime [7], [11]
However, only a few of them have addressed the prob-
lem of analyzing the Darknet networks to detect the most
influential domains. Some of them used approaches that
depend on Social Networks Analysis (SNA) techniques to
mine networks. Chen et al. [28] conducted a comprehensive
exploration of terrorist organizations to examine the robust-
ness of their networks against attacks. In particular, these
attacks were simulated by the removal of the items featured
by either their high in-degree or betweenness scores [29].
Moreover, Al Nabki et al. [2] proposed an algorithm, called
ToRank, to rank and detect the most influential domains
in the Tor network. ToRank represents the Tor network
by a directed graph of nodes and edges, and the most
influential nodes are the ones which removal would reduce
the connectivity among the nodes. However, the link-based
approaches would fail in evaluating the isolated nodes
which do not have connections to the rest of the community.
Therefore, as we show in the experiments section, this
approach can not surpass any of the benchmarked LtR
techniques.
Another different strategy was followed by Anwar et
al. [30], who presented a hybrid algorithm to detect the
influential leaders of radical groups in the Darknet forums.
Their proposal is based on mining the content of the user’s
profiles and their historical posts to extract textual features
representing their radicalness. Then, they incorporate the
obtained features in a customized link-based ranking algo-
rithm, based on PageRank [16], to build a ranked list of
radically influential users.
A different perspective was followed by the study car-
ried out by Biryukov et al. [14], who exploits the entry guard
nodes concept [15] to de-anonymize clients of an onion do-
main in the Tor network. The popularity of onion domains
in the Tor network is estimated by measuring its incoming
traffic; however, this approach will not be feasible when the
vulnerability is fixed.
The approach proposed in this work is entirely different
and, to the best of our knowledge, is not present in the liter-
ature. We adopt a supervised framework that automatically
learns how to order items following predefined ranking
criteria. Concretely, we employ an LtR model to capture
characteristics of a given ranked list and maps the learned
rank into a new unsorted list of items.
LtR framework has been used widely in the field of IR
[31], [32], [33]. Li et al. [34] proposed an algorithm to help
software developers in dealing with unfamiliar Application
Programming Interface (API) by offering software docu-
mentation recommendations and by training an LtR model
with 22 features extracted from four resources. Other exam-
ples are Agichtein et al. [35], who employed the RankNet
algorithm to leverage search engine results by incorporating
user behavior, or Wang et al. [36], who presented an LtR-
based framework to rank input parameters values of online
forms. They used 6 categories of features extracted from
user contexts and patterns of user inputs. Moreover, LtR
has been employed for mining social networks [37], [38] or
to detect and rank critical events in Twitter social network
[39], but none of those aforementioned works addressed the
study of Tor network from a content-analysis perspective.
3 PROPOSED RANKING FRAMEWORK
In this paper, we present a supervised framework to rank
Tor Hidden Services with the purpose of measuring the
influence of each domain (Fig. 2). Our approach has two
components: 1) Hidden Service Modeling Unit (HSMU), which
analyzes and extracts features from a given onion domain,
and 2) the Supervised Learning-to-Rank Unit (SLRU) that
learns a function to order a collection of domains according
to the pattern captured from previously sorted samples, a
training set.
3.1 Hidden Service Modeling Unit
Given an onion domain di ∈ D, where D is a set of
onion domains, the HSMU analyzes di to extract features
belonging to five different categories: text, named entity,
HTML, visual content, and network topology. Then, the
HSMU encodes those features into numerical values that
represent the HSs analyzed.
3.1.1 Text Features
The set of text features involves four types of descriptors
constructed from the text in di that is visible to the user.
Date and Time: A binary feature to indicate whether di has
been updated recently or not. A domain might be updated
by its owner or after receiving reviews from customers
concerning the offered service. We parsed the date and
time patterns, and we compared them with a configurable
threshold, computing this binary feature. This threshold is
a particular date-time point, whereas the actions beyond it
are considered obsolete.
4Fig. 2. A general view for the proposed framework for ranking and detecting the influential onion domains in the Tor network. The dashed orange
arrows indicate the training pipeline of the system, while the solid blue arrows indicate the testing/production phase.
Moreover, by counting these updates, we measured the
number of recent changes that di has received in the past.
We refer to these two features by recently updated and up-
dates counts, respectively.
HS Name: The address of a hidden service consists of
16 characters, randomly generated. The prefix of an HS
can be customized with tools like Shallot5, allowing that
the onion domain address includes words attractive to the
customers. For example, a drug marketplace could add the
words Cocaine or LSD to its HS’s URL. Nevertheless, the
customization process is extensively time-consuming; for
example, customizing the first seven characters requires one
day of machine-time while customizing 10 characters takes
40 years of processing.
To explore this characteristic, we split the concatenated
words using a probabilistic approach based on English
Wikipedia unigram frequencies thanks to Wordninja tool6.
We obtained two features: (i) the number of human-readable
words and (ii) the number of their letters. We named them as
address words count and address letters count, respectively.
Clones Rate: the number of onion domains that host the
same content under different addresses. After reviewing
5. https://github.com/katmagic/Shallot
6. https://github.com/keredson/wordninja
Darknet Usage Addresses Text (DUTA-10K) dataset7, we
realized that some onion domains have almost the same
textual content but hosted under different addresses. This
feature, i.e., HS duplication, might reflect concerns of the
domains’ owners about their services of being taken down
by authorities. The clones rate feature of di reflects the fre-
quency of the MD5 [40] hash code of its text.
Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF)
Vectorizer: we used this text vectorization technique to
extract and to weight domain-dependent keywords [41].
It allowed us to drow the following four features: 1) key-
word num: the number of words that are in common be-
tween the TF-IDF feature vector and the domain’s words
- we consider these words as the keywords of the domain,
2) keyword TF-IDF Acc: the accumulated TF-IDF weights of
the keywords, 3) keyword avg weight: the average weight of
the keywords, and 4) keyword to total: the number of the
domain’s words dived by the number of its keywords.
3.1.2 Named Entities Features
A textual Named Entity (NE) refers to a real proper name of
an object, including, but not limited to, persons, organiza-
tions, or locations. To extract those named entities, our pre-
vious work [42] adopted a Named Entity Recognition (NER)
7. http://gvis.unileon.es/dataset/duta-darknet-usage-text-addresses/
5model proposed by Aguilar et al. [43] to the Tor Darknet to
recognize six categories of entities: persons (PER), locations
(LOC), organizations (ORG), products (PRD), creative-work
(CRTV), corporation (COR), and groups (GRP). We map the
extracted NEs into the following five features:
NE Number: it counts the total number of entities in
di regardless of the category; we refer to this feature by
NE counter.
NE Popularity: an entity is popular if its appearance fre-
quency value is above or equal to a specific threshold that
we set to five, as is explained in Section 4.2.2. For every
category identified by the NER model, we use a binary
representation to capture the existence of popular entities
in the domain (1) or (0) otherwise. We refer to this feature as
popular NEX, where X is the corresponding NER category.
NE TF-IDF: accumulates the TF-IDF weight of all the de-
tected NE in di. This feature is denoted by NE TF-IDF.
TF-IDF Popular NE: accumulated TF-IDF weight of the
popular NE, and it is named popular NE TF-IDF.
Emerging NE: the frequency of the emerging product enti-
ties in di. We used our previous work [6] based on K-Shell
algorithm [44] and graph theory to detect these entities in
the Tor Darknet. We denote this feature by emerging NE.
3.1.3 HTML Markup Features
Using regular expressions, we parse the HTML markup
code of di to build the following eight features:
Internal Hyperlinks: number of unique hyperlinks that
share the same domain name as di. We denote it by inter-
nal links.
External Hyperlinks: refers to the number of pages refer-
enced by di on Tor network or in the Surface Web. We refer
to this feature by external links.
Image Tag Count: denotes the number of images referenced
in di. It is calculated by counting the < img > HTML tag in
the HTML code of di. We denote it by img count.
Login and Password: a binary feature to indicate whether
the domain needs login and password credentials or not. We
use a regular expression pattern to parse such inputs. This
feature is called needs credential.
Domain Title: a binary feature that checks whether the <
title > HTML tag has a textual value or not. We call it
has title.
Domain Header: a binary feature that analyzes if the
< H1 >HTML tag has a header or not. We named it has H1.
Title and Header TF-IDF: an accumulation of the TF-IDF
weight for the di title and header text. It is denoted by TF-
IDF title H1.
TF-IDF Image Alternatives: TF-IDF weight accumulation of
the alternative text. Some websites use an optional property
called < alt > inside the image tag < img > to hold a
textual description for the image. This text becomes visible
to the end-user to substitute the image in case it is not
loaded properly. It is denoted as TF-IDF alt.
3.1.4 Visual Content Features
The visual content could be an attractive factor for drawing
the attention of end-users rather than the text, especially
in the Tor HSs when the customer seeks to have a real
image of the product before buying it. A suspicious services
trader might incorporate real images of products to create an
impression of credibility to a potential customer. However,
the visual contents that are interesting for LEAs could be
mixed up with other noisy contents, such as banners and
images of logos. To isolate the interesting ones, we built a
supervised image classifier that categorizes the visual con-
tent into nine categories, where eight of them are suspicious,
and one is not. The definition of these categories is based
on our previous works [2], [11], where we created DUTA
dataset and its extended version DUTA-10K. The image
classification model was built using Transfer Learning (TL)
technique [45] on the top of a pre-trained Inception-ResNet
V2 model [46]. The visual content feature vector has six
dimensions distributed in the following manner:
Image Count: represents the total number of images in di,
both suspicious and non-suspicious images regardless of
their category. Suspicious stands for images that could con-
tain illicit content. We denote these features by total count,
suspicious count and noise count, respectively.
Average Classification Confidence: represents the averaged
confidence score of multiple images per category. These
features are named avg suspicious conf and avg normal conf,
respectively.
Majority Class: a binary flag to indicate whether the major-
ity of the images published in di are suspicious or not. This
flag is denoted by suspicious majority.
3.1.5 Network Structure Features
Additionally, we modeled the Tor network by a directed
graph of nodes and edges. The nodes refer to onion domains
and the hyperlinks between domains are captured by the
edges. This representation allowed us to built the following
seven features:
In-degree: refers to the number of onion domains pointing
to the domain di. It is called in degree.
Out-degree: indicates the number of hidden services refer-
enced by di, and it is named out degree.
Centrality Measures: for each domain di in the Tor net-
work graph, we evaluated three node’s centrality measures:
closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector [47]. In particular, the
closeness measures how short the shortest paths are from
di to all domains in the network, and it is named cls. The
betweenness measures the extent to which di lies on paths
between other domains, and it is named btwn. Finally, the
eigenvector reflects the importance of di for the connectivity
of the graph and it is denoted eigvec.
ToRank Value: ToRank is a link-based ranking algorithm to
order the items of a given network following their centrality
[2]. We applied ToRank to the Tor network to rank the onion
domains, and we used the assigned rank as a feature of the
node. Moreover, we used a binary flag to indicate whether
6di is in the top-X domains of ToRank or not. We refer to those
features as ToRank rank and ToRank top X, respectively.
After computing the forty features described (Table
3.1.5), we concatenate them to form a feature vector. How-
ever, given the variety of the scales of the features, we
normalize them by removing the mean and scaling to unit
variance.
TABLE 1
Summarization of the HSMU feature vector
Feat. Class Feat.Count Feat. Source Feat. Name
Textual 9
Date and Time - recently updated- updates count
HS Name - address words count- address letters count
Clones Rate - clones rate
TF-IDF Vectorizer
- keyword num
- keyword TF-IDF
- keyword avg weight
- keyword to total
Named
Entities 10
NE Popularity - popular NE (x)
Total NE Number - NE counter
TF-IDF NE - NE TF-IDF
TF-IDF Popular NE - popular NE TF-IDF
Emerging NE - emerging NE
HTML
Markup 8
Internal Hyperlinks - internal links
External Hyperlinks - external links
Image Tag Count - img count
Login and Password - needs credential
Domain Title - has-title
Domain Header - has H1
TF-IDF Title and Header - TF-IDF title H1
TF-IDF Image
Alternatives - TF-IDF alt
Visual
Content 6
Images Count
- suspicious count
- noise count
- total count
Average Classification
Count
- avg suspicious conf
- avg normal conf
Majority Class - suspicious majority
Network
Structure 7
In-degree - in degree
Out-degree - out degree
Centrality Measures
- cls (closeness)
- btwn (betweenness)
- eigvec (eigenvector)
ToRank Value - ToRank rank- ToRank top X
Total Features 40
3.2 Supervised Learning-to-Rank Unit
To learn the optimal order of the onion domains through
their descriptors, we adopt an LtR approach adapted from
the IR field. In a traditional IR problem, a training sample
is a vector of three components: the relevance judgment,
which can be binary [36] or with multiple levels of relevance
[48], the query ID, and the feature vector that describes
the ranked instance. However, our ranking system needs
to answer a unique question: What are the most attractive
onion domains in a determined area of activities?, and in the
context of our problem, the relevance judgment of an item
is a numerical score that is calculated and assigned per item.
These scores are set manually by a group of annotators that
we considered as ground truth for the ranking, whereas the
annotation procedure is described in Section 5.1. Hence, the
input vector for the SLRU is limited to the features of di
and its relevant judgment ri score in R, where R refers to
the ground truth rank. The vector of each sample di can be
modeled as V =< ri, di,1, di,2, ..., di,n >, n ∈ N , where di,n
is the nth feature of the domain di and N is the total number
of the ranking features, i.e. N = 40.
Our LtR schema aims to learn a function f that projects
a feature vector into a rank value (di,1, di,2, ..., di,n)
f−→ ri.
Therefore, the goal of an LtR scheme is to obtain the optimal
ranking function f that ranks D in a way similar to R. The
learning loss function depends on the used LtR architecture,
as explained in the following three subsections.
3.2.1 Pointwise
The loss function of the Pointwise approach considers only
a single instance of onion domains at a time [49]. It is
a supervised classifier/regressor that predicts a relevance
score for each query domain independently. The ranking is
achieved by sorting the onion domains according to yield
scores. For this LtR schema, we explore the Multi-layer
Perceptron (MLP) regressor [50].
3.2.2 Pairwise
It transforms the ranking task into a pairwise classification
task. In particular, the loss function takes a pair of items at
a time and tries to optimize their relative positions by min-
imizing the number of inversions comparing to the ground
truth [51]. In this work, we use the RankNet algorithm [51],
which is one of the most popular pairwise LtR schemes.
3.2.3 Listwise
This approach extends the pairwise schema by looking at
the entire list of samples at once [52]. One of the most well-
known listwise schemes is ListNet algorithms [53]. Given
two ranked lists, the human-labeled scores and the pre-
dicted ones, the loss function minimizes the cross-entropy
error between their permutation probability distributions.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
To test our proposal, we designed an experiment to answer
three research questions:
• What is the most suitable LtR schema for the task of
ranking the onion domains in the Tor network and
for detecting the influential ones?
• Which are the advantages of two different ranking
approaches, the content-based and the link-based?
• And what is the best combination of features for the
LtR model performance?
In this section, we discuss the motivation behind these
questions, describing in detail the analytical approach that
we conducted, and finally, we present our findings.
4.1 Evaluation Measure
The two most popular metrics for ranking Information
Retrieval systems are Mean Average Precision (MAP ) and
Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG) [54],
[55]. The main difference between the two is that the MAP
assumes a binary relevance of an item according to a given
query, while NDCG allows relevance scores in the form of
real numbers. Two characteristics suggest the use of NDCG
to evaluate the problem addressed in this paper. Thanks to
the first component of the Tor network monitoring pipeline
- the classification components-, all the addressed onion
domains are already relevant to the query, and second, the
7ground truth and the predicted rank produced by any of the
previously commented LtR schemes are real numbers, not
binary ones. To obtain the NDCG@K of a given query, we
calculate the DCG@K flowing the next formula (Eq. 1).
DCG@K = G1 +
K∑
i=2
Gi
log2(i)
(1)
Where G1 is the gain score at the first position in the
obtained ranked list, Gi is the gain score of the item i in that
list, and K refers to the first K items to calculate the DCG.
To obtain a normalized version of DCG@K is necessary to
divide it by IDCG@K , which is the ideal DCG@K sorted
by the gain scores in descending order (Eq. 2).
NDCG@K =
DCG@K
IDCG@K
(2)
4.2 Modules Configurations
4.2.1 Hardware Configurations
Our experiments were conducted on a 2.8 GHz CPU (Intel
i7) PC running Windows 10 OS with 16G of RAM. We
implemented the ranking models using Python3.
4.2.2 HSMU Configurations
In the TF-IDF text vectorizer, we set the feature vector
length to 10, 000 with a minimum frequency of 3, following
our previous work [11]. We used a NER model trained on
WNUT-2017 dataset8. To set the popularity threshold of the
popular NEX feature, we examined four values (3, 5, 10, 15),
and we assigned it to 5, experimentally. Additionally, we set
the threshold of the recently updated feature to three months
earlier to the dataset scraping date. To extract features from
the HTML code, we used BeautifulSoup library9. To con-
struct the Tor network graph, we used NetworkX10 library.
In the image classifier, we used the Transfer Learn-
ing (TL) technique with the pre-trained Inception-ResNet
V2 model released by Google11. The model was trained
and tested with a dataset of 9, 000 and 2, 700 samples,
respectively, equally distributed over nine categories. The
motivation behind selecting these categories is to have the
same classes as in our text classifier [11]. The dataset was
collected from Google Images using a chrome plugin called
Bulk Image Downloader. Table 2 shows the image classifier
performance per category.
4.2.3 SLRU Configurations
We used the dataset described in Section 5.1 to train and
test the three LtR models introduced in Section 3.2. Due
to the small number of samples in the drug domain, 290,
we conducted 5-fold cross-validation following recommen-
dations from previous works [53]. On each iteration, three
folds are used for training the ranking model, one fold
for validation, and one fold for testing. For the three LtR
models, the number of iterations is controlled by an early
8. https://noisy-text.github.io/2017/emerging-rare-entities.html
9. https://pypi.org/project/beautifulsoup4/
10. https://networkx.github.io/
11. http://download.tensorflow.org/models/inception resnet v2
2016 08 30.tar.gz
TABLE 2
The obtained F1 score by the image classifier over the testing set.
Category Name F1 Score (%)
Counterfeit Credit Cards 92.45
Counterfeit Money 96.78
Counterfeit Personal Identification 95.16
Cryptocurrency 94.60
Drugs 91.60
Pornography 98.53
Violence 93.80
Hacking 97.63
Others 86.78
stopping framework, which is triggered when there is no
remarkable change in the validation set at NDCG@10 [56].
The three LtR schemes commented in Section 3.2 shares
the same network structure but with different loss functions.
The neural network has two layers, with 128 and 32 neu-
rons, respectively. For non-linearity, a Rectifier Linear Unit
(ReLU) activation function is used [57]. To avoid overfitting,
the ReLU layer is followed by a dropout layer with a value
of 0.5 [58].
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: DRUGS CASE
STUDY
5.1 Dataset Construction
Darknet Usage Text Addresses 10K (DUTA-10K) is a pub-
licly available dataset proposed by Al-Nabki et al. [2] that
holds more than 10K onion domains downloaded from
the Tor network and distributed in 28 categories. In this
case study, we address the ranking of the onion domains
that were classified as Drugs in DUTA-10K. This category
contains drugs-topics activities, including manufacture, cul-
tivation, and marketing of drugs, in addition to drug forums
and discussion groups. Out of 465 drug domains in DUTA-
10K, we selected only English language domains what
makes a total of 290 domains. This ranking approach could
be adapted to any category of DUTA-10K, but we selected
the drugs-related domains due to its popularity in the Tor
network. We also want to stress that our approach is not
only limited to web domains, and it could be extended to
further fields such document ranking or influencers detec-
tion in social networks when a previously ranked list for
training is available.
To create the content-based dataset, thirteen people, in-
cluding the authors, ranked manually the 290 drugs-related
domains, to build a dataset that served as ground truth.
For keeping the consistency in the ranking criteria among
the annotators, we created a unified questionnaire of 23
subjective binary questions (Table 3) that were answered by
the annotators for each domain. The ground truth is built in
a pointwise manner assigning an annotator a value to each
domain, coming from answering to every question with a 1
or 0, that corresponds to Yes or No, respectively.
This process is repeated three times, assigning to each
annotator a new batch of approximately 23 domains every
time, different in each iteration. Thus, each onion domain
is judged three times by three different annotators, and
8as a result, each domain is represented by three binary
vectors of answers. Following the majority voting approach,
we unified these answers’ vectors of every hidden service
into a single vector of 23 dimensions, that correspond with
the number of questions. Finally, for a given domain, the
vector of answers is aggregated into a single real number,
a gain value, by adding up its elements, corresponding the
obtained sum with the ground truth rank of that domain.
The higher the gain value, the higher the rank an onion
domain obtains.
TABLE 3
The binary questionnaire used to build a ground truth rank for the drugs
onion domains.
Questions
Has a satisfactory FAQ? Has a communication channel?
Has a professional design? Has real images for the products?
Has a subjective title? Sells between 2 to 10 products?
Provides safe shipping? Domain name has a meaning?
Offers reward or discount? Products majority are illegal?
Sell more than 10 products? Still accessible in TOR network?
Shipping worldwide service? Sells at least one popular product?
Reputation content? Requires login/ registration?
Accepts only Cryptocurrency? Recently updated?
Can customers add a review/
feedback?
Do you feel that this domain
is trustable?
Need text spotting for the
products’ images
Are you satisfied with the
products description?
Has more than 10 sub-pages?
5.2 Learning to Ranking Schema Selection
In Section 3.2, we evaluated three well-known LtR schemes,
namely, pointwise, pairwise, and listwise, and for each
one, we explored a supervised ranking algorithm: MLP,
RankNet, and ListNet, respectively. We wanted to know
what is the most suitable LtR schema for the task of ranking
the onion domains in the Tor network and detecting the
influential ones. Fig. 3 compares the three LtR algorithms
for NDCG at ten different values of K , and given the
importance of having the head of a list ranked correctly
more than its tail [36], [59], we illustrate the top-10 values of
K individually.
Fig. 3 shows the superiority of the Listwise approach
when each domain is represented by a vector of 40 features
extracted from five different kinds of resources (Section 3.1).
The same figure shows that the NDCG@1 of the ListNet is
equal to one, which means that during the five folds of cross-
validation, the algorithm ranked correctly the first domains
tested, exactly as the ground truth. At NDCG@4, the curve
starts dropping; however, the lowest NDCG value was
0.88 for K equals to 25. As also can be seen in Fig. 3, the
pointwise approach, which is the MLP in our case, obtained
the worst performance, which agrees with the conclusion of
other researchers [48].
In addition to comparing the performance in terms of the
NDCG@K , we registered the duration of the time required
to train and to test each LtR model, i.e., starting from the
moment the model receives a list of domains encoded by
HSMU (Section 3.1) until it produces their rank. On average,
for the five-folds, the ListNet model took 8.30 seconds for
training and 0.08 seconds for testing. The RankNet took 7.35
seconds for training and 0.007 seconds for testing. Finally,
Fig. 3. A comparison between three LtR algorithms against multiple
values of NDCG@K. The horizontal axis refers to K value and the
vertical one indicates the NDCG scores of the algorithms, obtained at
each value of K.
the fastest one was the MLP model, which took 3.34 seconds
for training and 0.0009 seconds for testing. This comparison
shows that the ListNet model is the slowest one due to the
complexity of its loss function comparing to the ones of the
RankNet and the MLP algorithms.
5.3 Link-based versus Content-based Ranking
Having two distinct ranking strategies raises a question:
which is the most suitable ranking approach? Content-based or
link-based?. To answer it, we explore four link-based al-
gorithms, namely, ToRank [2], PageRank [16], Hyperlink-
Induced Topic Search (HITS) [17], and Katz [18]. In par-
ticular, we compare the best LtR model of our approach,
i.e., ListNet, which is considered as a supervised ranking
algorithm, with the four link-based algorithms that are
unsupervised. We represent the Tor network by a directed
graph that consists of nodes and directed edges, where
nodes represent the onion domains, and the hyperlinks
between them are captured using the directed edges.
Comparison configuration. Unlike our approach, the
link-based algorithms do not require training data. To obtain
a fair comparison, we carried out 5-folds cross-validation
with the same random seed for both ranking approaches.
Then, we constructed a directed graph out of the testing
nodes and applied the link-based algorithms; finally, both
approaches were evaluated using the same test set. For the
link-based algorithms, we evaluated several configuration
parameters and selected the ones that obtained the highest
NDCG (Table 4).
Fig. 4 shows that ListNet highly surpasses all the link-
based ranking algorithms. We observe that the weakest LtR
approach, i.e., MLP, which obtained a NDCG@10 of 0.71,
outperforms the best link-based ranking algorithm, ToRank,
which scored NDCG@10 of 0.69. This result emphasizes
the importance of considering the content of domains rather
than their hyperlinks connectivity only.
5.4 Feature Selection
In the previous sections, we concluded that ListNet outper-
forms the RankList and MLP content-based and the four
9TABLE 4
The examined parameters for the link-based ranking algorithms. Bold
numbers correspond to the selected configuration that achieved the
highest NDCG value.
Algorithm Name Parameter Evaluated values
PageRank alpha 0.5, 0.70, 0.75.0.80,0.85,0.90max iter 10, 100, 1000, 10000
ToRank alpha 0.50, 0.70, 0.80, 0.90, 1.00beta 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6
HITS max iter 10, 100, 1000, 10000
Katz
alpha 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.9
beta 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.0
max iter 10, 100, 1000, 10000
Fig. 4. A comparison between the content-based versus link-based
ranking algorithms with respect to multiple values of K. The horizontal
axis refers to K value and the vertical one indicates the NDCG scores
the algorithms obtained at each value of K.
link-based algorithms when the proposed forty features
represent an onion domain. However, the cost of these
features varies. Some of them, such as the visual content,
requires building a dedicated image classification model,
while other features could be extracted merely using a
regular expression. The cost is reflected in the time necessary
to obtain the features and to build the ranking model, in
addition to the inference time. On average, per domain,
the prediction of the image classification model was the
most expensive and took 109 seconds, followed by the NER
model with 22 seconds, and then it was the text features
that required 12 seconds. Finally, the HTML and the graph
features were the fastest ones to be extracted, spending 3
and 2 seconds, respectively.
In the following, we want to answer the question: what
is the feature or combination of features that produce the best
performance of the LtR model ? To answer this question,
we conducted feature analysis for the best LtR model, the
ListNet one, using features and combining them from the
five different resources. To discover the best combination
of features for the ranking system performance, we trained
and tested five ListNet models for each source of features
and compared their performance.
When we analyze only features coming from a single
source, without combining them, it can be seen in Fig. 5 that
the features that are extracted only from text, denoted by
text and in clear green in this figure, achieves the highest
NDCG@5 of 0.90. Very close to them is the model trained
using only recognized named entities (NER) features, which
obtains a NDCG@5 of 0.85. After that, using only fea-
tures extracted from HTML, the ListNet model obtains a
NDCG@5 of 0.81. In contrast, the graph features obtain the
lowest NDCG@5 of 0.65, which indicates their weakness
for ranking the onion domains, unlike the features that are
extracted from the text, which have shown a significant and
positive impact on the NDCG metric. Hence, we conclude
that the features extracted from the user-visible text are
more representative comparing to the ones coming from the
visual characteristics of the domain or the graph ones.
After the previous analysis, we decided to investigate
the effect of combining features from different sources, to
measure the impact of those combinations on the model
performance. In Figure 5 it can be seen that the performance
increases when the top-3 individual features, i.e. text, NER,
and HTML are fused. Also, those three features combined
could obtain a NDCG close to the one yield by combining
all the features (All). Consequently, we could remove the
graph and the visual features and keep the ranking perfor-
mance relatively high and very close to the case when all
the features are used.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The Tor network is overfull with suspicious activities that
LEAs are interested in monitoring. By ranking the onion
domains according to their influence inside the Tor network,
LEAs can prioritize the domains to leverage the monitoring
process.
In this paper, we created several ranking frameworks
using Learning-to-Rank (LtR) to detect the most influential
onion domains in the Tor darknet using different sources of
features. Our purpose was to determine which is the best
approach that allows the best performance with the lower
complexity in the model creation. The proposed framework
consists of two components. 1) Hidden Service Modeling
Unit (HSMU), that represents an onion domain by 40 fea-
tures that are extracted from five different resources: the
domain user-visible text, the HTML markup of the web
page, the named entities in the domain text, the visual
content, and the Tor network structure; and 2) Supervised
Learning-to-Rank Unit (SLRU), that learns how to rank the
domains using LtR approach. To train the LtR model, we
built a manually sorted dataset of 290 drugs-related onion
domains.
We tested the effectiveness of our framework on a
manually ranked dataset of onion domains related to drug
trading. We explored and evaluated three common LtR
algorithms: MLP, RankNet, and ListNet, considering that
the method which obtained the highest NDCG is the best
one. We found that the ListNet algorithm outperforms the
rest of the ranking algorithms with a NDCG@10 of 0.95.
Moreover, we contrasted our framework with four link-
based ranking algorithms, and we observed that the MLP
with a NDCG@10 of 0.71, which is the worst LtR algo-
rithm, is better than the best link-based one, ToRank, which
obtained a NDCG@10 of 0.69.
Given the superiority of the ListNet algorithm, we ana-
lyzed how the different kinds of features impact the rank-
ing performance. We found that using only the features
extracted from the user-visible textual content, including
the text, the named entities, and HTML markup code, the
model achieves a NDCG@4 of 0.97, exactly the same as the
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Fig. 5. The effect of using different types of features along with their combinations on the ListNet ranking model. The vertical axis refers to the
NDCG value, while the horizontal axis denotes the value of K. Each curve refers to a source of features: textual (text), featured produced by
a Named Entity Recognition (NER), HTML markup features (HTML), visual features (visual), graph features (graph), and all the features fused,
denoted as (All).
model that uses all the features. However, at NDCG@10,
the performance drops slightly to 0.88 comparing to 0.91
using the five different sources of features. Considering both
the cost to obtain the features and to create the models
and its score, we recommend the text-NER-HTML model
because its cost is low, and its score is almost the same as
the more complex approach that uses all the features.
In the future we plan to explore additional LtR methods
from the listwise approach such as RankBoost [60] and
LambdaMart [61]. Moreover, we will explore the StarSpace
algorithm [62] that attempts to learn objects representations
into a common embedding space that could be used to
entities ranking and recommendation systems. Finally, in
order to ease the process of building the training dataset,
both in terms of time and the number of the labeled samples,
we plan to explore the Active Learning technique [63],
which selects the most distinct samples to be sorted by an
expert.
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